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Abstract: Microfinance is widely recognized as a powerful method for poverty 
alleviation. However, little is known about the characteristics of those who 
default on their loans. Understanding the behavior of borrowers is an important 
component of mitigating adverse selection and the moral hazard of lending. Both 
of these concepts embody some of the greatest challenges faced by microfinance 
institutions, and they provide the major motivation for this study. Accordingly, 
the main objective of this research is to investigate whether non-delinquent 
borrowers and delinquent borrowers of a microfinance institution reveal any 
difference in their level of risk preference and time preference. This is tested 
through an artefactual field experiment with 97 borrowers from the National 
Microfinance Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In the experiment, 
participants chose between six choices that measure their level of risk preference. 
In addition, participants selected a voucher that varies both in time and in value 
to capture their time preference levels. The results reveal that non-delinquent 
borrowers are more likely to be risk-seeking and impatient individuals when 
compared to delinquent borrowers, contradicting current literature on risk 
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Understanding the framework behind the mechanics of borrowing behavior is crucial 
for creating sound policies that are effective for poverty alleviation. Stiglitz and Weiss’s 
seminal paper (1981) provided the context for understanding the relationship of moral hazard 
to lending credit. Since borrowers are incentivized to pursue risky investment projects, this in 
turn decreases the probability of repayment. It is important for microfinance institutions to 
understand the underpinnings of the behavioral framework to such models and test them with 
both experimental and survey data. Moreover, it is imperative for microfinance institutions to 
operate under a lean business model in order to stay on target with their mission statement. 
These strict guidelines consequently provide little room for error when delivering high cost-
low profit loan products to the poorest of the poor in developing countries.  
I present two artefactual field experiments carried out among Jordanian microfinance 
borrowers of the National Microfinance Bank of Jordan to test whether delinquent borrowers 
are more risk-seeking than non-delinquent borrowers, and whether delinquent borrowers are 
more impatient than non-delinquent borrowers. This paper tests the theory of Stiglitz and 
Weiss’s (1981) seminal paper, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, in addition 
to a newer alternative theory in behavior credit market literature that suggests consumption 
today is preferred over the future (Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010). 
 To test these hypotheses, I carried out an artefactual field experiment among 97 
microfinance borrowers of the National Microfinance Bank of Jordan. This study was 
conducted nation-wide and included a stratified sample of borrowers. The sample includes 
approximately one-third of borrowers who have experienced some difficulty or severe difficulty 
with repaying their loans (referred to as delinquent borrowers). The remaining participants 
were selected from a group of borrowers who had experienced no difficulty in repaying their 
loans (referred to as non-delinquent borrowers). 
 Two experiments were conducted to collect behavioral data on risk preferences and 
time preferences. The risk experiment asked participants to choose one out of six risk 
preference choices. Each choice had a 50 percent chance of receiving a high or low payoff, and 
each of the six risk choices increased in both the variance of risk and the expected payoff. At the 
end of the experiment, participants were paid in full. In contrast, the time preference 
experiment required each participant to choose between receiving a smaller amount in one 
week or a larger amount in five weeks. After the participants made this initial selection, 
participants were also asked to choose between a voucher worth some amount in one year or a 
larger amount in one year and one month.  
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 My experimental results reveal that non-delinquent borrowers hold a stronger 
preference for risk-seeking than delinquent borrowers. In other words, the results provide no 
empirical support for the Stiglitz and Weiss model. In addition, my experimental results on 
time preference indicate that borrowers who are patient now but impatient in the future (future 
bias time inconsistency) are more likely to be a non-delinquent borrower. This result 
contradicts the more recent behavioral models (Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010). While the 
experiments do not capture the full dynamics behind decision-making in regard to risk 
preferences and time preferences, the results question the framework of the behavioral models 
in credit markets as applied to microfinance in the Middle East.   
The next section will present a review of the literature. Section 3 describes the 
methodology, experiments, and survey data. Section 4 presents the data analysis. Lastly, 
section 5 presents a discussion of the results.  
2. Literature Review 
Microfinance is a term used to describe the provision of financial services to individuals 
who are generally excluded from traditional banking. It is often considered a mechanism for 
alleviating poverty because it helps overcome credit market failures by providing low-income 
individuals with access to credit. These individuals would otherwise rely on informal sources 
for these services because the poor are often thought of as being too risky and impatient for 
traditional banking services (Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). This 
paper investigates the impact of risk preference, trust, and time preference on microfinance 
defaults to see if assumptions about the poor hold true. It is hypothesized that microfinance 
borrowers default on their loans due to risky investment decisions and possessing little 
patience for the future (Binswagner, 1980). This is also believed to explain poverty traps among 
the poor in developing countries. Contrary to this hypothesis, recent literature has proposed an 
alternative explanation to why borrowers default. The alternative belief is that poor people 
default on their loans because they are not risky enough, thus, making the loan unproductive 
and as a result become unable to pay back their loans (Zeballos et al. 2011). The following 
literature review will explore how risk preference, trust, and time preference can help explain 
why a proportion of individuals default on their microloans.  
As previously mentioned, the poor are often thought of as risky individuals and are 
unlikely to receive loans from formal banking institutions. Formal banking institutions are also 
reluctant to lend to the poor due to minimal, if any, holdings of assets for collateral. 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) have been able to provide loan products to the poor with no 
collateral by compensating for the risk by charging very high interest rates. Interestingly, high 
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interest rates could potentially deter individuals from requesting a loan. Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) suggest that interest rates serve as a potential screening device for borrowers. They 
propose that only the worse borrowers are willing to take out loans at high interest rates 
because their probability of repayment is minimal. Therefore, as banks increase interest rates, 
they are simultaneously increasing the probability of attracting risky borrowers. Safer 
investments typically yield lower returns compared to riskier investments, thus, as interest 
rates increase so does the probability of the investment being risky because the borrower needs 
a higher return in order to be able to pay the high interest rate. Consequently, banks could 
potentially become unsustainable by raising their interest rates too high. Then again, what is 
considered to be a high interest rate? The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) 
reported that the global average interest rate is around 35%, which can be interpreted as quite 
conservative depending on the country (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2008). If all of 
these assumptions hold true, we could conclude that clients of MFIs are, on average, risky 
borrowers and, as a result, there should be high default rates among MFIs globally.  
One of the greatest challenges for lending institutions is limiting the likelihood of 
lending to a client who could default. One possible way to address this challenge could be by 
determining an individual’s risk preference during the due diligence process by having 
borrowers participate in an experiment. A seminal paper by Binswanger (1980) conducted one 
of the first experiments eliciting risk preferences from 330 unskilled rural laborers in India to 
see if there was a difference in their investment behavior. Risk preferences were elicited 
through a gambling experiment with real payoffs. Risk-aversion did not appear to be influenced 
by wealth when participants played for high payoffs. An effect was only apparent when low 
payoffs were used in the game.  
In spite of Binswanger’s findings, Stiglitz and Wiess (1981) proposed that those who 
achieved their wealth from returns on risky investments in the past are potentially less risk-
averse than conservative individuals who invested in safer projects. Individuals who are willing 
to take the most risk are those who possess the most capital. According to Stiglitz and Weiss, 
the poor should be considered as risk-averse. Giné et al. (2009) found comparable results with 
an experiment that mimicked the framework of microfinance, which took place in a controlled 
laboratory setting in Lima, Peru. Their findings suggest that risk-averse borrowers will always 
choose the safer project for investment when placed under an individual liability contract. 
Further, they found it likely that commitment mechanisms and incentives play a significant role 
in reducing default rates. 
On the other hand, are the poor risky investors, or are they reluctant to invest? Wydick, 
Cassar, and Zeballos (2011) used an artefactual field experiment to test if risky borrowers 
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prefer to consume their entire payoffs or to invest in a risky investment. Contrary to the 
findings by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), they found no evidence to suggest that risky borrowers 
prefer risky investments and instead found that they would rather consume their loans than 
invest in a safe project. This further supports Banerjee and Mullainathan’s (2010) assumption 
that when the borrower knows that the safer investment would yield little returns they would 
rather choose to increase their current consumption. 
Similarly, Banerjee and Mullainathan’s (2010) model provides a counter result of the desire 
for consumption smoothing. According to their model, expectations for an increase in future 
income could potentially transfer an individual’s desire to spend on non-temptation goods 
today toward saving for the future. The model suggests that it could potentially outweigh the 
effects of consumption smoothing. For this reason, expecting future income from a loan 
transfers the borrower’s desire to consume today and invest in the future by paying back their 
loan. However, the model also predicts the opposite effect to take place when an individual 
knows that their future income will fall. If a borrower’s loan were invested in a project whose 
profits began to decline, they would be willing to increase consumption for the present and 
consequently default on the loan, willingly foregoing any future loans. The importance of 
taking up a loan is only inherent if it can significantly change an individual’s level of wealth. 
Trust has been shown to play an important role within a society because it is positively 
correlated with economic growth (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2006). Cassar and Wydick (2010) 
infer that social capital is crucial because it leads to higher levels of societal trust. Likewise, low 
levels of social capital were also linked to low contribution rates among group borrowers in 
Kenya, according to Cassar and Wydick (2010). However, trust has also been shown to have a 
negative effect on the likelihood of a borrower repaying their loan. Karlan (2005) conducted a 
trust experiment with Peruvian microfinance borrowers and found that participants who were 
considered to be more trusting were associated with having the most issues with repaying their 
loans. On the other hand, participants that were seen as more trusting of others (trustworthy) 
from the game were deemed more likely to repay their loans.  
According to O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), there are two types of people: those who are 
sophisticated and those who are naive. Both types of people deal with activities related to costs 
and rewards quite differently. Sophisticated people are those who know that they will have issues 
with self-control in the future while naive people do not. Non-delinquent borrowers see the loan 
as a cost and therefore would rather pay off their loan as soon as possible in fear of 
procrastinating and potentially defaulting. Whereas delinquent borrowers are more impatient 
and less likely to save because they would rather consume their money in the present. Since 
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they have little self-control, they lack the capital saved from their return on investment from 
their loan and consequently fall into default.  
This is parallel to the findings of Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010). However, their models 
differ by incorporating initial levels of wealth as a factor. Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) 
suggest that if a wealthy individual were to give into their temptation at high levels of 
consumption, it would result in a much smaller fraction of their total consumption compared to 
the poor. The poor are assumed to make myopic decisions and to be impatient which is why 
they borrow at exorbitantly high interest rates. This assumption is associated with the model 
of consumption decision-making, which states that people possess a strong inclination to 
consume in the present rather than the future. Nevertheless, two individuals who possess 
identical discount rates but hold different levels of wealth reveal dissimilar levels of patience. 
Individuals who are rich will appear patient where as individuals who are poor will appear 
impatient. This conjecture is contradictory to standard utility theory; whereas an investment is 
only important if it can significantly change an individual’s status. 
In addition, Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) propose that individuals “chain” their 
temptations to multiple periods of one’s self. A person is more tempted in the present because 
they know that a portion of their earnings will be wasted in every subsequent period until the 
last period. Therefore, an individual would prefer to give into temptation today. If someone 
knows that eventually they will give in then they would rather choose today than tomorrow 
since they will have a greater welfare gain. By comparison, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) 
suggest that welfare losses are greatest for sophisticated people because with each period they 
choose to procrastinate they suffer from a small welfare loss. The total welfare loss is absorbed 
by the accumulation in increments of each welfare loss. As a result, those who are sophisticated 
prefer to act today rather than tomorrow in order to have a greater welfare gain. 
Risk preference, trust, and time preference have major implications on why borrowers 
default on their loans. If an individual has a significant present bias then access to credit could 
have negative impacts on welfare. Similarly, the shaping of an individual’s expectations has vast 
implications in the microfinance sector. When approaching the problem as a whole it could 
potentially lead to myopic behavior among practitioners and economists. Binswanger (1980) 
believes that the poor are being held back because of external constraints, such as access to 
credit, which he suggests is a better indicator of the differences in investment behavior than 
risk preferences. Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) recommend that a time discount 
experiment is needed to show that the apparent difference in patience between the poor and 
rich is a result of a difference in the composition of consumption instead of a mere difference in 
patience among the two. Certainly, there is a need to further understand risk preference, trust, 
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and time preferences through behavior models to further examine the impact that access to 
credit may have on poverty alleviation. This paper contributes to the existing literature in two 
ways. First, this paper adds to the minimal literature that exists on microfinance in the Middle 
East. Second, this paper reveals borrowing behavior characteristics of microfinance clients 
through the use of experimental data that captures both risk preference and time preference. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Microfinance Institution  
 This analysis is focused on individual borrowers from the National Microfinance Bank 
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (NMB). The behavioral and survey data were collected in 
the summer of 2012 throughout various regions of the country. NMB, a Jordanian private 
shareholding nonprofit company, finances entrepreneurs in underserved portions of society 
through micro-credit lending. NMB began dispersing loans in March of 2006 under the 
patronage of Her Majesty Queen Rania and His Highness’ Prince Talal bin Abdul-Aziz. NMB 
has grown from three branches in 2006 to 11 branches in 2012 with plans to open several more 
branches within the next year. An important factor that may influence this analysis is that 
bankruptcy courts do not exist in Jordan. If a borrower takes out a loan, they are required to 
repay their loan by law, no matter the time frame. If the borrower is unable to pay, they are 
obligated to go to court, and will face jail time if they are found guilty. 
3.2 Sample Selection 
The survey design generated a random sample of clients from 9 of the 11 NMB 
branches. In the sample population, we see that there are several differences between 
delinquent and non-delinquent borrowers. First, 35% of the sample population has completed 
BASIC (the first ten years of schooling) and 35% have completed secondary school1. Within the 
subsample of borrowers, the average level of education for delinquent borrowers is 2.91, 
equating to approximately a secondary level of education. In contrast, the average level of 
education for non-delinquent borrowers is 2.42, which is slightly lower than the total average. 
In addition, the average age for a delinquent borrower is 40 years old, and a non-delinquent 
borrower is 37 years old. Delinquent borrowers also reported a higher average household 
income than non-delinquent borrowers by 51.15JD2 (≈ $72.30). Additionally, the average loan 
                                                
1 Figures 3A and 3B further describe the distribution in the levels of education between non-delinquent 
borrowers and delinquent borrowers. 
2 1 US Dollar equals approximately 0.71 Jordanian Dinar 2   ll r ls r i t l  .  J r i  i r 
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size is greater for delinquent borrowers than non-delinquent borrowers by 91JD (≈ $128.62). 
However, these differences are not statistically significant between subsamples.  
3.3 Survey Methodology  
  NMB operates 11 branches throughout various regions of Jordan. Two branches were 
excluded from this study for several reasons. The first branch, Al-Mafraq, was excluded 
because delinquent borrowers did not exist within this branch. It is speculated from NMB that 
a very strong social capital network exists in this town and no borrowers default on their loans. 
Most of the people who occupy this region work for the military and as a result are financially 
stable. The second branch excluded was the main branch of Western Amman, which carried 
very few loans that were greater than 3500JD (≈ $4,948.31).          
A focus group was conducted during the initial stage of the research. Three NMB 
branches were randomly selected to conduct the focus groups and were led by the enumerators. 
Questions on risk preferences, trust, and time preferences were discussed to understand the 
cultural dynamics of these three subjects pertaining to Jordanian culture. This process was 
imperative in order to further understand the nature of the survey questions and their relative 
importance within Jordanian society. One example considers the practice of wearing your 
seatbelt, and how it is perceived in Jordan. Not wearing your seatbelt in the U.S. is considered 
to be very risky (aside from legality of the activity). However, in Jordan, wearing your seatbelt 
is required but not enforced because it is a new law. As a result, social pressure does not 
provide any influence and law enforcement does not actively force an individual to wear their 
seat belt. To determine if an individual who is not wearing a seat belt is seen as a risky activity 
it is necessary to pilot such questions before testing, especially when the culture and social 
norms of the researcher can hinder the outcome of the results through biasing the question 
(Hines, 1993). 
I chose individual borrowers from NMB in the following way. First, only borrowers 
who have taken out a business loan that were less than or equal to 3500JD (≈ $4,948.31) were 
selected. The loan size was capped at 3500JD in order to focus on micro-entrepreneurs. The 
type of individual borrower is distinguished either as a non-delinquent or a delinquent 
borrower. Non-delinquent borrowers are those who have never been late on repayment 
regarding their current loan as of the collection period in June 2012. Delinquent borrowers are 
randomly chosen from two different groups. The first group is comprised of delinquent 
borrowers who are within a ten-day grace period. These are the type of borrowers who need 
more of a nudge to make sure they repay without being charged a penalty even though they are 
still technically late. The second group is comprised of borrowers who are greater than ten 
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days late in repayment. These are the borrowers that NMB has contacted to inquire as to why 
the borrower was unable to repay and many are being pursued through legal channels. NMB 
attempts to figure out an alternative repayment plan or if legal matters need to be pursued to 
collect repayment. Upon allocating all the borrowers of NMB into the two groups of borrowers 
(non-delinquent and delinquent), the sample was randomly selected from these lists. There 
were three instruments used to elicit data, including two experiments, and a survey to collect 
data on risk preferences, trust, and time preferences.  
3.4 Experimental Methodology 
The risk experiment was replicated from the Eckel-Grossman Risk Task (2002, 2008). 
Participants were asked to participate in a risk aversion experiment to elicit their relative risk 
preference (see Appendix A). There are six choices that the participant has to choose from in 
the form of six circles. Each circle is split in half. One half shows the low payoff amount and the 
other half shows the high payoff amount. All choices have a 50 percent chance of winning the 
high or low payoff amount. The six choices are structured in a clockwise manner that 
represents a dial. The one o’clock position, the safest choice, produces a guaranteed payoff with 
zero variance of risk. As one moves clockwise from this choice, each choice increases in both the 
expected returns and the variance of risk. The sixth choice holds the same value in expected 
returns as the fifth choice; however, the variance of risk increases. As a result, a borrower who 
chooses the sixth choice is considered to be extremely risk-seeking. After the participant 
chooses his or her choice, an enumerator flips a coin to determine whether they will receive the 
high or low payoff. The participant is presented with the coin to validate the two sides of the 
coin so they can trust the outcome of the coin toss. The coin is flipped into the air and upon 
being caught into the palm of the enumerator’s hand, would then flip it onto the back-side of 
their palm. The enumerators were trained to conduct the coin toss in the same manner to 
provide consistent results. This simple design provides participants with an elegant means to 
preserve a sufficient range of risk choices. It is important to note that in previous studies each 
of the risk choices are referred to as gambles (Eckel and Grossman, 2002, 2008). I make a 
distinction in this paper that these “gambles” are referred to as choices. Participants were 
informed that by participating in the experiment they would be rewarded for both the 
experiment and the survey. This was a strict protocol in this experiment for gambling is 
forbidden in Islam3. Participants were paid for the risk experiment immediately following the 
end of the survey. 
                                                
3 All necessary measures were taken to abide by the social norms and religious guidelines of Islam as to 
not offend or to tempt participants to engage in a forbidden activity. 
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Additionally, the same participants were asked to take part in a time preference 
experiment to estimate their level of patience. This experiment incorporated a front-end delay 
due to present-bias responses. People often choose to take something that is offered today 
rather than in the future (Harrison, 2002). It should be noted that the purpose of this method is 
not to estimate the discount rate, which is similar to other time preference experiments 
(Harrison, 2002). After the protocol is read to the participant, they are asked to make a decision 
between accepting a voucher for the present that is worth 1JD in one week, or 1.5JD in five 
weeks, and a voucher for the future that is worth 1JD in 12 months, or 1.5JD in 13 months. For 
example, a participant might choose 1JD in one week and 1.5JD in 13 months. Then, the 
enumerator flips a coin to determine whether the participant receives the present voucher (1JD 
in one week) or the future voucher (1.5JD in 13 months). People who receive these vouchers 
can redeem them at local grocery stores. Since participants are paid for the risk experiment, it 
is assumed that it would instill some level of trust for the participant to feel that the voucher is 
redeemable. In order to prevent duplication of the store vouchers, each voucher was signed by 
the researcher with a red glitter pen, numbered, and hole punched in the shape of a music note. 
The name of the store was listed on each voucher along with the name of the participant, their 
mobile number, and the date for which the voucher could be redeemed4. If participants do not 
trust that the voucher is valid, then most participants would choose the option to have the 
voucher that is redeemable in one week. Since the credit loan officer is well acquainted with the 
borrowers, and the stores that people from certain neighborhoods frequent the most, he or she 
would coordinate the locations of the grocery stores that were accessible by the participants. 
The enumerators confirmed the location of the grocery store and its accessibility with the 
participant. 
To further determine a borrower’s time preference, I coded their response to the choices 
of present and future vouchers. If a borrower chose a voucher for 1 week and 12 months, then 
this person was coded as having a strong present-bias, or are more impatient with respect to 
choices affecting their consumption in a week from the day the survey took place than with 
respect to choices about future consumption. Borrowers who chose a voucher starting in 1 
week and 13 months are coded as having a weak present-bias. Those who chose a voucher 
starting in 5 weeks and in 12 months are future-bias time inconsistent, or are patient now but 
impatient in the future. Lastly, if a borrower chose a voucher starting in 5 weeks and in 13 
months they are considered to be future time consistent. 
                                                
4 I am able to circumvent having to deliver the voucher back to the participants by creating a 
redeemable date on the voucher. 
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Lastly, trust was elicited through three questions that were implemented after the risk 
preference and time preference questions in the household survey. The survey included three 
questions regarding trust from the General Social Survey (GSS) questions on “trust”, “fairness”, 
and “helping”. Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) contend that these three questions are a better 
indicator of trustworthiness instead of trust. Previous studies that have regressed both trust 
and trustworthiness on these GSS questions have shown a higher correlation with 
trustworthiness than with trust (Glaeser et al., 2000; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2004; Lazzarini 
et al., 2004). The GSS questions are incorporated based on Karlan’s (2005) findings to see if 
trustworthiness can explain the probability of being a non-delinquent in the context of a 
microfinance client of NMB. 
The descriptive statistics for the risk preference and time preference experiments are 
displayed in table 2. The average level of risk preference is 3.6, with a median of 3, on a scale of 
6. The sample population has a higher, on average, level of risk-seeking preference. When 
comparing the means of non-delinquent and delinquent borrowers, a test statistic reveals no 
significant difference between the two types of borrowers5. In addition, when I compare the 
means of non-delinquent and delinquent borrowers by each type of time preference, there is no 
statistically significant difference between the two types of borrowers. When looking at the 
distribution of responses to the risk experiment, as seen in Figure 2, we can see that the total 
count of responses is higher for non-delinquent borrowers in each risk-seeking choice from the 
experiment. The only risk choice where delinquent borrowers responded more than non-
delinquent borrowers is in the lowest risk-seeking choice. 
3.5 Empirical Estimations 
I use a normal Ordinary Least Squares regression with a binary dependent variable 
(Linear Probability model) instead of a Probit or a Logit model to measure the effect of risk 
preference on the probability of being a non-delinquent borrower. The Linear Probability (LP) 
model offers some of the same advantages as the Probit and Logit models except the LP model 
specifies P(Yi=1|X) as a linear function. The marginal effects of X on P(Yi=1|X) is restricted 
to be constant for all values of X, thus they are easier to interpret. However, the standard 
errors are heteroskedastic in nature, so I use Eicker-Huber-White heteroskedastic-consistent 
standard errors. In addition, I want to constrain the predicted value of being a non-delinquent 
or delinquent borrower between 0 and 1. I have also chosen the LP model because including a 
summary index (using a weighted average) with the Probit or Logit model will lead to 
                                                
5 When using a two-tail test there is no significant difference. However, a one-tail test reveals non-
delinquent borrowers are more risk-seeking than delinquent borrowers at the 10% level of significance. 
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asymptotic bias (Train, McFadden, & Goett, 1987). Through the use of this model, it will be 
possible to test the effect of risk preference and trust on the probability of whether an 
individual borrower i is a non-delinquent borrower while controlling for other factors. My 
Linear Probability model, looking at the characteristics of risk, estimates: P !! = 1 !! =   β!   +   β!R!   +   β!RI!   +   β!TI! + β!X!   +   ε!                                      (1) 
where !! is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if an individual borrower i is a non-delinquent 
borrower and 0 if an individual borrower i is a delinquent borrower. The right-hand side 
variables include the level of risk tolerance from the experiment, β!R! , a risk tolerance index 
variable, β2IRi, a trust index variable, β3TIi, and observed and unobserved factors, β4Xi and !! , 
respectively. It is possible to test the first hypothesis of this research through the use of the 
Linear Probability model: 
Hypothesis: Risk Preference 
H0: There is no significant difference between the level of risk preference between non-
delinquent and delinquent borrowers. 
Ha: There is a significant difference between the level of risk preference between non-
delinquent and delinquent borrowers. 
Additionally, I use a Linear Probability model to estimate how time preference 
determines the probability of whether an individual borrower i is a non-delinquent borrower 
while controlling for other factors. My Linear Probability model, looking at the characteristics 
of time preference, estimates: 
 P !! = 1 !! =   β!!!!   +   β!!!!   + β!FTI! +   β!R! + β!TPI!   +   β!X!   +   ε!                                         (2) 
where !! is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if an individual borrower i is a non-delinquent 
borrower and 0 if an individual borrower i is a delinquent borrower. The right-hand side 
variables include a dummy variable for an individual who is strong present-biased,  β!!!!, a 
dummy variable indicating a weak present-biased individual, β!!!! , a dummy variable 
representing an individual with future-biased time inconsistency (dummy for time-consistent 
preferences is omitted), β!FTI! , level of risk tolerance from the experiment, β!R! a time 
preference index variable, β5TPIi, and observed and unobserved factors, β6Xi and !! , 
respectively. It is possible to test the second hypothesis of this research through the use of the  




Hypothesis: Time Preference 
H0: There is no significant difference between the level of time preference between non-
delinquent and delinquent borrowers. 
Ha: There is a significant difference between the level of time preference between non-
delinquent and delinquent borrowers. 
3.5 Summary Indices 
 There were three summary indices created for my empirical estimations. The summary 
index approach was replicated from Michael Anderson (2008). In general, a summary index is a 
weighted average of several uniform outcomes (Anderson, 2008). The weights are calculated in 
such a way that the index is able to capture the maximum amount of information. This method 
is preferred because I am able to group multiple outcomes into a single test. The construction 
of the summary index can be found in Appendix C6. 
I define three indices based on borrowing characteristics: risk preferences, trust, and 
time preferences. The risk tolerance index is defined by the qualitative responses to the risk 
questions asked on the survey. Each of the nine questions contained a 0 or 1 response, 0 equal 
to risk-averse and 1 equal to risk-seeker. The risk tolerance index is on a scale from -.756, 
extremely risk-averse, to .986, risk-seeking. The trustworthy index contains three GSS 
questions, which are the most widely accepted questions used to determine an individual’s level 
of trustworthiness. I coded the responses to the trustworthy questions in the following manner: 
0 equal to the least amount of trustworthiness and 1 being equal to the most amount 
trustworthiness. The trustworthy index ranged from -.442, not trusting of others, to 1.295, 
most trusting of others. The time preference index contained nine questions with each response 
equal to 0 if impatient or 1 if patient. The time preference index is on a scale from -.960, no 
patience, to .671, very patient.  
4. Data Analysis  
4.1 Risk 
Table 3 shows the Linear Probability estimations of the impact of risk characteristics by 
the type of borrower using Eicker-Huber-White heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in 
order to produce asymptotically valid standard errors and t-statistics7. Column 1 solely 
                                                
6 Note this is an efficient generalized least squares (GLS) estimator. 
7 I also performed the same regressions using hc2, hc3, and bootstrap standard errors. Even though the Eicker-
Huber-White heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are less conservative, the results maintain the same level 
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considers the effect of the risk experiment on the type of borrower. From column 1, the results 
indicate that an individual’s risk preference does not display a significant impact on the 
probability of being a non-delinquent. The experiment is not robust to exclusively indicating 
the probability of being a non-delinquent. In column 2, I incorporate only the basic controls of 
an individual (excluding characteristics that could affect the likelihood of obtaining a loan). 
Here, the risk experiment remains insignificant; however, age has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient. A one-year increase in the age of a borrower increases the probability of 
being a non-delinquent borrower by 8 percentage points. Similarly, age2 is negative and 
statistically significant. Since the coefficient for age is positive and age2 is negative, this tells us 
that age matters less with each additional year. When I control for characteristics that could 
affect the likelihood of obtaining a loan in column 5, the risk experiment variable becomes 
significant. An increase in the risk-seeking choices of the experiment increases the probability 
of being a non-delinquent by 6 percentage points. In column 3 and 4, I specify the model to 
either include the risk tolerance index or risk experiment, respectively, since the risk 
experiment and risk index simultaneously become statistically significant in column 5. It is 
important to note that neither the risk experiment nor the risk tolerance index coefficients are 
significant by themselves. Thus, I can rule out that one variable is not influencing the other. I 
also ran a correlation test between these two variables and the results show there is a 
correlation of 0.646. This rules out the possibility of multicollinearity. With this in mind, the 
reason the coefficients for the risk experiment and the risk tolerance index reveal opposite signs 
is because the risk experiment captures risk behavior of the borrowers for a single task. 
Whereas the risk tolerance index includes qualitative outcomes regarding questions related to 
various risk tasks from the survey. Furthermore, the risk experiment coefficient remains 
significant and approximately the same size in columns 6 and 7. However, it is bewildering that 
an increase in education decreases the predicted probability of an individual being a non-
delinquent borrower by 8 percentage points. Additionally, in columns 6 and 7, I control for the 
location of the branch from where the borrower took out their loan. If a borrower is located at a 
rural branch then they are more likely to be a non-delinquent borrower by 45 percentage 
points and it is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. Likewise, when I control 
for Ramadan it is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. 
Approximately half of the sample was surveyed before Ramadan and the other half during 
Ramadan. However, when I break this down into subsamples, there are more delinquent 
                                                                                                                                                       
of statistical significance. Thus, I report the original model with Eicker-Huber-White heteroskedastic-consistent 
standard errors.  
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borrowers as a percentage of borrowers that were surveyed during Ramadan than compared to 
non-delinquents borrowers as a percentage of borrowers. 
These estimations reveal that non-delinquent borrowers are more likely to be more 
risk-seeking than delinquent borrowers. However, delinquent borrowers are on average more 
educated than non-delinquent borrowers. The results also reveal that being more risk-seeking 
is crucial to understanding why some borrowers are less likely to default. An explanation as to 
why non-delinquent borrowers are likely to have lower levels of education could be that they 
were gaining entrepreneurial experience that affected their ability to carefully make risky 
decisions in business. Delinquent borrowers remained longer in academia and inherently faced 
a different type of risk. In addition, the results show that loan size does not have a statistically 
significant effect on the type of borrower. One of the oldest living texts contradicts these 
findings, stating that the size of the loan affects its productivity as well as the ability to repay 
the loan (Matthew 25:14-30). However, I am unable to arrive at any conclusion regarding the 
effect of loan size on the probability of being a non-delinquent borrower. 
I included an additional variable to the model, a trustworthy index, to provide more 
explanatory power in predicting the type of borrower. Karlan (2005) found that participants 
who were considered to be more trusting of others were also associated with difficulty in loan 
repayment. In column 7 of table 3, all of the coefficients remain relatively the same. Moreover, 
all of the variables that revealed significance from column 6 retain the same sign. While the 
coefficient for the trustworthy index does reveal the same sign as Karlan’s (2005) findings, the 
results show that the trustworthy index is not statistically significant. Therefore, I am unable 
to arrive at a concrete conclusion by including the trustworthy index. 
Further, since the risk experiment and the risk tolerance index reveal opposite signs I 
disaggregated the index to see if the questions are a good indicator of an individual’s risk 
measure. In table 6, I regressed the same controls from column 6 of table 3 except all nine 
regressions focus solely on each individual risk preference question comprised from the index8. 
For each risk preference question, the response is coded as 0 if the participant responded with 
the risk-averse answer, and 1 if the participant responded to the risk tolerant answer. In 
column 5, risk question #5 is negatively correlated with being a non-delinquent borrower and 
is statistically significant at the 10% level.  This question asks “do you often stick with what 
you know or try new things”? Moreover, a borrower who often prefers to try new things is 
predicted less likely to be a non-delinquent borrower by 18 percentage points. It is also 
important to highlight that the risk experiment is statistically significant between the 5% and 
10% level and remains positive throughout each specification. In summary, the only risk 
                                                
8 The risk preference questions that correspond to each specification in table 6 can be found in Appendix D. 
 15	  
 
preference question that is a good indicator of an individual’s risk measure is whether a 
borrower often tries new things or sticks to what they know. 
4.2 Time Preference 
In table 4, I present the Linear Probability estimates of time preference by type of 
borrower. Three different specifications are utilized in this table. Columns 1-3 include strong 
present-bias, weak present-bias, and future-bias time inconsistency variables while controlling 
for basic demographic variables to see if my model is robust to the inclusion of other variables. 
I am cautious of spurious correlations given the number of degrees of freedom in my model. 
The basic controls include gender, marriage, age and age2, education, and reported household 
income. Columns 4 - 6 include additional controls for borrowing behavior such as loan size, a 
dummy if currently employed, a dummy for branch location, and controls for researcher and 
enumerator influence along with a dummy if the survey took place during Ramadan. My model 
omits a dummy for future time-consistent preferences, replicating a similar study by Bauer et 
al. (2012).  
When I control for the same factors9 as my previous Linear Probability model from 
table 3 and only include the strong-present bias variable, I found the coefficient is positive but 
not statistically significant. I would expect a negative coefficient, since being impatient is 
usually correlated with being a delinquent borrower (Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010). My 
controls display approximately the same values for marginal effects and the signs remain in the 
same direction.  
In column 2, I only include the weak present-bias variable and the same controls as 
column 1. The results indicate that the coefficient for weak present bias is not statistically 
significant. The other variables regarding risk preference, education, current employment, age 
and age2, and a dummy for branch location all produce similar coefficients and the same signs 
as my previous specification.  
When I control for future bias time inconsistency in column 3, however, I found it is 
statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. If a borrower is patient now but 
impatient in the future (future time inconsistency), then a borrower is more likely to be a non-
delinquent borrower by 24 percentage points. In this specification, the coefficient for age and 
age2 remain significant. Thus, again we see that age is important, but it is less important with 
each additional year. This is a peculiar finding since most analyses in the literature suggest that 
individuals are present biased (Takeuchi, 2011). 
                                                
9 I excluded the risk tolerance index. 
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To further elicit the effects of time preference on the probability of being a non-
delinquent borrower, I control for strong present-bias, weak present-bias, and future-bias time 
inconsistency in columns 4, 5, and 6, respectively. In addition, I include other explanatory 
variables that may help explain borrowing characteristics. I am also controlling for time 
preference index, loan size, whether a borrower is currently employed, a dummy for rural 
branch, Ramadan, and controls for both researcher and enumerator influence. Here, the results 
show that strong and weak present-bias variables remain insignificant and future-bias time 
inconsistency loses significance.  
Lastly, the time preference index was disaggregated into different regressions to 
illustrate the impact of an individual’s time preference measure that could capture strong 
present bias, weak present bias, and future bias time inconsistency in tables 7, 8, and 9, 
respectively. For each time preference question, the response is coded as 0 if the participant 
responded with the impatient answer, and 1 if the participant responded to the patient answer. 
In table 7, 8, and 9, I regress the same controls from columns 4 - 6 of table 410. The only 
question that remains significant when measuring time preference is the time preference 
question #4, which asks “if you have 2 knafa would you be more likely to eat them all today or 
eat one today and save the rest for later”? A knafa is a sweet pastry that is commonly consumed 
among all income strata in Jordan11. The question on knafa is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level in column 4 of table 7, 8, and 9. The time preference dummy variable 
that captures strong present bias and future bias time inconsistency is insignificant in all 
specifications. The weak present bias dummy variable is only statistically significant in column 
8. However, the time preference question that is being controlled for in this column is 
statistically insignificant. In summary, after disaggregating the time preference index only one 
time preference question is shown to be a good indicator of an individual’s time preference 
measure. 
4.2 Robustness checks 
 Since my time preference results are unusual, I ran a robustness check to see if there is 
evidence of something driving these results. I test this by running the same regression as in 
table 4, columns 1-3 with the exception of differentiating whether the experiment took place 
before or during Ramadan. I chose these three specified models since the future-bias time 
inconsistency coefficient was statistically significant. However, I see no statistical significance 
                                                
10 The time preference questions that correspond to each specification in tables 7, 8, and 9 can be found in 
Appendix E. 
11 This question was selected from the focus group as the most widely consumed dessert among households in 
Jordan, especially during the Holy month of Ramada. 
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among any of the time preference variables when I split the sample between whether the survey 
took place before Ramadan or during Ramadan. As a result, I can conclude that Ramadan is not 
driving the results of future-bias time inconsistency from column 3 in table 4. 
 Furthermore, I checked the standardized residuals of each model to identify any 
influential observations. Through using this method with a threshold of 3 (in absolute value) I 
found that the specified model in column 6 of table 3 contained one influential outlier with a 
standardized residual of -3.02. Subsequently, I ran the model again after dropping this outlier 
and I found similar results as before except age2 is no longer significant. The fully specified risk 
model remains robust with the exclusion of the influential outlier as seen in table 5.  
5. Summary and Conclusions 
One of the shortcomings of this paper is the limited sample size of the borrowers, which 
could explain the uneven distribution of non-delinquent and delinquent borrowers. An ideal 
study would have a roughly even ratio of delinquent to non-delinquent borrowers in order to 
provide a more equivalent variance between the two groups. Even though the GSS questions 
are highly correlated with trustworthiness (Glaeser et al., 2000; Johansson-Stenman et al., 
2004; Lazzarini et al., 2004), I am unable to reveal similar findings with my experimental data. 
The ideal situation would have microfinance borrowers participate in a Trust Game to match 
the results of the risk experiment with the survey data, similar to Karlan (2005). 
Further research should be conducted to see the effect of Ramadan on an individual’s 
time preference. I suspect that during the time of Ramadan, people are more self-disciplined 
than at other times during the year. This is mainly because Ramadan is a time period in which 
Muslims are required to reflect on their shortcomings and better themselves as religious 
individuals. Nevertheless, it was beneficial to collect loan information on microfinance 
borrowers preceding the month of Ramadan. This allowed me to control for any effects that 
Ramadan could have had on the participants. Since this study collected data before Ramadan, it 
could have been more informative to collect loan information on borrowers before Ramadan, 
during Ramadan, and after Ramadan in addition to having the borrowers participate in the risk 
and time preference experiments during both periods. This would indicate the effect of 
Ramadan on the time preference of microfinance borrowers while simultaneously controlling 
for risk preference. 
As seen from table 3, loan size did not have an effect on the probability of a borrower 
defaulting on his or her loan; however, delinquent borrowers from the sample hold larger loans 
than non-delinquent borrowers. It is possible that the reason borrowers go into default in the 
first place could be that loan officers are offering the borrower a larger loan once he or she pays 
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off their initial loan. This may not seem like a problem at first, however, if the borrower’s 
income remains constant and their loan size has increased, this will eventually cause the 
borrower to face higher loan repayment schemes than they can manage. This seemed to happen 
with some degree of frequency. A loan officer has an incentive to keep a borrower in their 
portfolio if they have repaid one or more loans because the loan officer knows they can rely on 
that borrower. Loan officers are provided with an incentive to disburse a certain amount of 
loans each month. In order to meet this quota there is an additional incentive to the loan officer 
to distort the demand of loans by offering loans to borrowers who they know are unable to 
repay. NMB monitors the activity of credit loan officers but it is difficult to always capture this 
in time. It is important for future studies to determine the best type of payment scheme for loan 
officers, for they play a crucial link in the chain of driving the mission of microfinance.  
In addition, it is perplexing to see that from this study delinquent borrowers have 
higher years of education and are more risk-averse than non-delinquent borrowers. Typically, 
an individual who has invested more years in education would receive a relatively higher 
income, holding everything else constant. Hence, a borrower would be more likely to repay 
their loans because income and repayment should be positively correlated. When taking an 
individual’s time preference into account this could ultimately change this assumption as 
suggested by the results of this study.  
The focus of this paper differs from previous literature because it does not focus on the 
types of investments an individual makes (Zeballos, Cassar, & Wydick, 2011) but rather on 
measuring an individual’s level of risk preference. Based on risk theory, it is assumed that a 
riskier borrower would likely invest in a risky project (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981) with a greater 
probability of defaulting on their loan. Under this assumption, my analysis contradicts Stiglitz 
and Weiss’s (1981) theory that greater risk leads to greater defaults. My empirical results 
reveal that non-delinquent borrowers are more likely to be more risk-seeking than delinquent 
borrowers. Thus, I can reject the null hypothesis and state that there is a difference in the level 
of risk preference between the two types of borrowers. In addition, the regression analysis 
rejects the time preference hypothesis. When I take into account different variables for time 
preference I see that having a future-bias time inconsistency preference increases the 
probability of an individual being a non-delinquent borrower. In other words, a non-delinquent 
borrower is likely to be an individual who is patient now with respect to choices affecting their 
current consumption than with respect to choices about future consumption. Thus, I can reject 
the null hypothesis and state that there is a difference in the level of time preference between 
the two types of borrowers. It is not surprising that my results differ from past studies given 
the unique time period in which the data were collected, as well as the novelty of the study 
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location in the Middle East. There is limited information on microfinance borrowers from 
countries that observe Ramadan on a national scale. Based on my analysis regarding borrowers 
of the National Microfinance Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, I can conclude that 
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Total	  Sample	   8	   6	   34	   34	   5	   4	   5	   1	  
Non-­‐delinquent	   6	   6	   19	   23	   3	   2	   1	   1	  














































Total	  Sample	   8.25%	   6.19%	   35.05%	   35.05%	   5.15%	   4.12%	   5.15%	   1.03%	  
Non-­‐delinquent	   9.84%	   9.84%	   31.15%	   37.70%	   4.92%	   3.28%	   1.64%	   1.64%	  



























Table	  1	  —	  Summary	  Statistics	  of	  Sample	  by	  Type	  of	  Borrower	  
(Means,	  Standard	  Deviations,	  Min—Max)	  
	  	   Total	   Non-­‐delinquent	   Delinquent	   T-­‐Statistic	  
Age	  (years)	   38.216	   37.098	   40.111	  
1.353	  	   (10.332)	   (9.342)	   (11.71)	  
	   20—62	   20—58	   20—62	  
Currently	  Employed	   .381	   .393	   .361	  
-­‐0.315	  	   (.488)	   (.492)	   (.487)	  
	   0—1	   0—1	   0—1	  
Education1	   2.608	   2.426	   2.916	  
1.605	  	   (1.432)	   (1.371)	   (1.5)	  
	   0—7	   0—7	   0—6	  
Loan	  Size	   767.391	   735.833	   826.562	  
0.758	  	   (560.682)	   (578.945)	   (528.537)	  
	   300—3500	   300—3500	   300—2200	  
HH	  Income	   404.597	   382.766	   433.914	  
1.135	  	   (196.957)	   (180.439)	   (216.386)	  
	   150—1000	   150—900	   155—1000	  
Female	   .907	   .934	   .861	  
-­‐1.101	  	   (.291)	   (.249)	   (.350)	  
	   0—1	   0—1	   0—1	  
Sample	  Size	   97	   61	   36	   	  




Table	  2	  —	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  of	  Experiment	  (Means	  and	  Standard	  Deviations)	  
	   Total	   Non-­‐delinquent	   Delinquent	   T-­‐Statistic	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(.401)	   1.486	  






Table	  3	  —	  Risk	  by	  Type	  of	  Borrower	  
	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	   (7)	  
Variables	   Non-­‐delinquent	  Non-­‐delinquent	  Non-­‐delinquent	  Non-­‐delinquent	   Non-­‐delinquent	   Non-­‐delinquent	  Non-­‐delinquent	  
Risk	  Experiment	   0.0427	   0.0387	  
	  
0.0478	   0.0588*	   0.0590**	   0.0558**	  
	   (0.0267)	   (0.0288)	   	  
(0.0306)	   (0.0312)	   (0.0240)	   (0.0238)	  
Risk	  Tolerance	  
Index	  
	   	  
-­‐0.244	  
	  
-­‐0.281*	   -­‐0.213**	   -­‐0.201*	  
	   	   	  
(0.151)	  
	  
(0.150)	   (0.105)	   (0.102)	  
Trust	  Index	  










0.0445	   0.0186	   0.0595	   -­‐0.0263	   -­‐0.157	   -­‐0.143	  
	   	  
(0.208)	   (0.218)	   (0.219)	   (0.223)	   (0.129)	   (0.127)	  
Married	  
	  
-­‐0.160	   -­‐0.200	   -­‐0.200	   -­‐0.171	   -­‐0.0438	   -­‐0.0633	  
	   	  
(0.157)	   (0.166)	   (0.152)	   (0.148)	   (0.128)	   (0.132)	  
Age	  
	  
0.0795**	   0.0880**	   0.0635	   0.0850*	   0.0433*	   0.0502*	  
	   	  
(0.0372)	   (0.0412)	   (0.0445)	   (0.0430)	   (0.0251)	   (0.0270)	  
(Age)2	  
	  
-­‐0.00110**	   -­‐0.00123**	   -­‐0.000917*	   -­‐0.00122**	   -­‐0.000647*	   -­‐0.000732**	  
	   	  
(0.000439)	   (0.000503)	   (0.000544)	   (0.000517)	   (0.000324)	   (0.000349)	  
Education	  
	  
-­‐0.0369	   -­‐0.0732	   -­‐0.0671	   -­‐0.0855*	   -­‐0.0788**	   -­‐0.0762**	  
	   	  




-­‐0.0988	   -­‐0.0352	   -­‐0.0272	   -­‐0.0519	   0.0333	   0.0685	  
	   	  
(0.129)	   (0.134)	   (0.139)	   (0.140)	   (0.104)	   (0.105)	  
Ln	  (Loan	  size)	  
	   	  
0.0431	   -­‐0.000427	   0.0449	   -­‐0.0283	   -­‐0.0578	  
	   	   	  
(0.120)	   (0.122)	   (0.114)	   (0.0914)	   (0.103)	  
Employed	  
	   	  
0.0251	   0.0524	   0.0716	   0.145	   0.0907	  
	   	   	  
(0.122)	   (0.118)	   (0.124)	   (0.0891)	   (0.0949)	  
Rural	  Branch	  
	   	   	   	  
	   0.457***	   0.449***	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	   (0.100)	   (0.107)	  
Ramadan	  
	   	   	   	  
	   -­‐0.574***	   -­‐0.568***	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	   (0.0933)	   (0.0972)	  
Constant	   0.474***	   -­‐0.102	   -­‐0.543	   -­‐0.116	   -­‐0.541	   0.319	   0.223	  
	   (0.113)	   (0.948)	   (1.296)	   (1.315)	   (1.254)	   (0.845)	   (0.884)	  
Add’l	  Controls	   NO	   NO	   NO	   NO	   NO	   YES	   YES	  
Observations	   97	   82	   73	   77	   73	   73	   71	  
R-­‐squared	   0.026	   0.138	   0.160	   0.147	   0.208	   0.611	   0.619	  
Notes:	  Additional	  controls	  are	  for	  Researcher	  and	  Enumerator	  influence.	  







Table	  4	  —	  Time	  Preference	  by	  Type	  of	  Borrower	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	  
Variables	   Non-­‐delinquent	   Non-­‐delinquent	   Non-­‐delinquent	   Non-­‐delinquent	   Non-­‐delinquent	   Non-­‐delinquent	  
Strong	  Present	  Bias	   0.0990	  
	   	  
0.0197	  
	   	  
	   (0.110)	   	   	  
(0.0863)	  
	   	  Weak	  Present	  Bias	  
	  
-­‐0.0705	  
	   	  
0.150	  
	  
	   	  
(0.129)	  
	   	  
(0.104)	  
	  Future	  Bias	  Time	  
Inconsistency	  
	   	  
0.242*	  
	   	  
0.101	  
	   	   	  
(0.125)	  
	   	  
(0.121)	  
Time	  Preference	  Index	  
	   	   	  
0.0631	   0.0839	   0.0533	  
	   	   	   	  
(0.153)	   (0.155)	   (0.149)	  
Risk	  Experiment	  
	   	   	  
0.0506**	   0.0476**	   0.0490**	  
	   	   	   	  
(0.0247)	   (0.0236)	   (0.0242)	  
Female	   0.0756	   0.0488	   -­‐0.0105	   -­‐0.100	   -­‐0.0719	   -­‐0.124	  
	   (0.208)	   (0.209)	   (0.211)	   (0.132)	   (0.141)	   (0.138)	  
Currently	  Married	   -­‐0.189	   -­‐0.178	   -­‐0.174	   -­‐0.0170	   -­‐0.0110	   -­‐0.0130	  
	   (0.165)	   (0.160)	   (0.155)	   (0.137)	   (0.121)	   (0.129)	  
Age	   0.0901**	   0.0860**	   0.0816**	   0.0439*	   0.0359	   0.0425	  
	   (0.0359)	   (0.0363)	   (0.0356)	   (0.0255)	   (0.0264)	   (0.0256)	  
Age2	   -­‐0.00121***	   -­‐0.00117***	   -­‐0.00113***	   -­‐0.000611*	   -­‐0.000523	   -­‐0.000604*	  
	   (0.000427)	   (0.000434)	   (0.000425)	   (0.000334)	   (0.000336)	   (0.000334)	  
Education	   -­‐0.0266	   -­‐0.0329	   -­‐0.0520	   -­‐0.0578	   -­‐0.0628*	   -­‐0.0678*	  
	   (0.0462)	   (0.0445)	   (0.0441)	   (0.0368)	   (0.0366)	   (0.0367)	  
Ln	  (Household	  Income)	   -­‐0.105	   -­‐0.100	   -­‐0.0673	   -­‐0.0213	   0.0113	   -­‐0.0144	  
	   (0.128)	   (0.128)	   (0.124)	   (0.103)	   (0.104)	   (0.102)	  
Ln	  (Loan	  Size)	  
	   	   	  
-­‐0.0169	   -­‐0.00548	   -­‐0.00848	  
	   	   	   	  
(0.0877)	   (0.0887)	   (0.0895)	  
Currently	  Employed	  
	   	   	  
0.135	   0.169*	   0.141*	  
	   	   	   	  
(0.0853)	   (0.0886)	   (0.0818)	  
Rural	  Branch	  
	   	   	  
0.366***	   0.397***	   0.353***	  
	   	   	   	  
(0.0999)	   (0.0978)	   (0.0991)	  
Ramadan	  
	   	   	  
-­‐0.611***	   -­‐0.632***	   -­‐0.610***	  
	   	   	   	  
(0.0971)	   (0.0927)	   (0.0952)	  
Constant	   -­‐0.233	   -­‐0.0763	   -­‐0.114	   0.390	   0.256	   0.387	  
	   (0.947)	   (0.957)	   (0.963)	   (0.824)	   (0.815)	   (0.815)	  
Additional	  Controls	   NO	   NO	   NO	   YES	   YES	   YES	  
Observations	   82	   82	   82	   77	   77	   77	  
R-­‐squared	   0.127	   0.121	   0.145	   0.576	   0.590	   0.580	  
Notes:	  Additional	  controls	  are	  for	  Researcher	  and	  Enumerator	  influence.	  As	  a	  robustness	  check,	  I	  dropped	  the	  Time	  Preference	  Index	  in	  columns	  4-­‐
6	  but	  arrive	  at	  the	  same	  results.	  







Table	  5	  —	  (Robustness	  Check)	  Risk	  by	  Type	  of	  Borrower	  
	  
(1)	  
Variables	   Non-­‐delinquent	  
Risk	  Experiment	   0.0505**	  
	  
(0.0217)	  
Risk	  Tolerance	  Index	   -­‐0.218**	  
	  
(0.108)	  
Female	   -­‐0.178	  
	  
(0.161)	  
Currently	  Married	   -­‐0.0297	  
	  
(0.132)	  
Age	   0.0494	  
	  
(0.0314)	  
(Age)2	   -­‐0.000708*	  
	  
(0.000391)	  
Education	   -­‐0.0823**	  
	  
(0.0376)	  
Ln	  (Household	  Income)	   0.0122	  
	  
(0.100)	  
Ln	  (Loan	  Size)	   -­‐0.0311	  
	  
(0.0900)	  
Currently	  Employed	   0.136	  
	  
(0.0849)	  
Rural	  Branch	   0.521***	  
	  
(0.0994)	  
Researcher	   -­‐0.0426	  
	  
(0.0319)	  
Enumerator	   -­‐0.00576	  
	  
(0.0280)	  
Ramadan	   -­‐0.628***	  
	  
(0.0862)	  
Constant	   0.337	  
	  
(0.900)	  
Observations	   72	  
R-­‐squared	   0.665	  






Table	  6	  —	  Borrowing	  Behavior	  by	  Individual	  Risk	  Measures	  
	  	   Non-­‐delinquent	  Borrower	  
Variables	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	   (7)	   (8)	   (9)	  
Risk	  1	   -­‐0.00222	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
(0.0920)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Risk	  2	  
	  
-­‐0.0456	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	  
(0.0847)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Risk	  3	  
	   	  
-­‐0.0688	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
(0.0923)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  Risk	  4	  
	   	   	  
-­‐0.0179	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
(0.0816)	  
	   	   	   	   	  Risk	  5	  
	   	   	   	  
-­‐0.180*	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
(0.0947)	  
	   	   	   	  Risk	  6	  
	   	   	   	   	  
0.0154	  
	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
(0.100)	  
	   	   	  Risk	  7	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
-­‐0.0109	  
	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
(0.0965)	  
	   	  Risk	  8	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
0.00254	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
(0.0834)	  
	  Risk	  9	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
-­‐0.0533	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
(0.0989)	  
Risk	  Experiment	   0.0498**	   0.0538**	   0.0529**	   0.0499**	   0.0404*	   0.0489**	   0.0483**	   0.0529**	   0.0477**	  
	  
(0.0246)	   (0.0262)	   (0.0234)	   (0.0238)	   (0.0228)	   (0.0229)	   (0.0238)	   (0.0238)	   (0.0235)	  
Female	   -­‐0.0994	   -­‐0.116	   -­‐0.117	   -­‐0.101	   -­‐0.112	   -­‐0.0990	   -­‐0.0883	   -­‐0.0894	   -­‐0.107	  
	  
(0.130)	   (0.126)	   (0.123)	   (0.131)	   (0.135)	   (0.129)	   (0.134)	   (0.125)	   (0.127)	  
Currently	  Married	   -­‐0.00595	   -­‐0.00414	   -­‐0.00186	   -­‐0.00426	   -­‐0.0247	   0.000380	   -­‐0.00531	   -­‐0.00366	   -­‐0.0139	  
	  
(0.129)	   (0.125)	   (0.122)	   (0.129)	   (0.152)	   (0.130)	   (0.130)	   (0.131)	   (0.128)	  
Age	   0.0412	   0.0421	   0.0409	   0.0404	   0.0450*	   0.0412	   0.0424	   0.0422	   0.0440*	  
	  
(0.0268)	   (0.0254)	   (0.0251)	   (0.0257)	   (0.0246)	   (0.0259)	   (0.0262)	   (0.0263)	   (0.0248)	  
(Age)2	   -­‐0.000	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000*	  
	  
(0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	  
Education	   -­‐0.0572	   -­‐0.0558	   -­‐0.0635*	   -­‐0.0582*	   -­‐0.0672**	   -­‐0.0559	   -­‐0.0575*	   -­‐0.0547	   -­‐0.0592*	  
	  
(0.0350)	   (0.0340)	   (0.0328)	   (0.0340)	   (0.0306)	   (0.0350)	   (0.0343)	   (0.0345)	   (0.0354)	  
Ln	  (Household	  Income)	   -­‐0.0193	   -­‐0.0210	   -­‐0.0146	   -­‐0.0158	   0.0637	   -­‐0.0188	   -­‐0.0202	   -­‐0.0233	   -­‐0.0192	  
	  
(0.106)	   (0.101)	   (0.101)	   (0.105)	   (0.0996)	   (0.103)	   (0.105)	   (0.102)	   (0.102)	  
Ln	  (Loan	  Size)	   -­‐0.0227	   -­‐0.0234	   -­‐0.00800	   -­‐0.0236	   -­‐0.0677	   -­‐0.0222	   -­‐0.00947	   -­‐0.0196	   -­‐0.0189	  
	  
(0.0827)	   (0.0844)	   (0.0838)	   (0.0849)	   (0.0739)	   (0.0833)	   (0.0885)	   (0.0860)	   (0.0859)	  
Currently	  Employed	   0.139	   0.146*	   0.133	   0.136	   0.123	   0.136	   0.143	   0.127	   0.144*	  
	  
(0.0840)	   (0.0836)	   (0.0852)	   (0.0849)	   (0.0805)	   (0.0872)	   (0.0855)	   (0.0864)	   (0.0845)	  
Rural	  Branch	   0.375***	   0.373***	   0.381***	   0.374***	   0.415***	   0.373***	   0.369***	   0.391***	   0.385***	  
	  
(0.103)	   (0.0932)	   (0.0972)	   (0.0947)	   (0.0913)	   (0.0951)	   (0.0979)	   (0.0939)	   (0.0926)	  
Researcher	   -­‐0.0648	   -­‐0.0648	   -­‐0.0641	   -­‐0.0646	   -­‐0.0609	   -­‐0.0656	   -­‐0.0650	   -­‐0.0641	   -­‐0.0630	  
	  
(0.0456)	   (0.0448)	   (0.0446)	   (0.0451)	   (0.0442)	   (0.0460)	   (0.0484)	   (0.0466)	   (0.0449)	  
Enumerator	   -­‐0.0119	   -­‐0.0110	   -­‐0.00537	   -­‐0.0128	   -­‐0.00822	   -­‐0.0119	   -­‐0.0109	   -­‐0.0173	   -­‐0.0129	  
	  
(0.0278)	   (0.0277)	   (0.0298)	   (0.0270)	   (0.0277)	   (0.0278)	   (0.0285)	   (0.0278)	   (0.0274)	  
Ramadan	   -­‐0.620***	   -­‐0.619***	   -­‐0.612***	   -­‐0.619***	   -­‐0.589***	   -­‐0.619***	   -­‐0.612***	   -­‐0.603***	   -­‐0.630***	  
	  
(0.0913)	   (0.0914)	   (0.0909)	   (0.0911)	   (0.0926)	   (0.0915)	   (0.0927)	   (0.0922)	   (0.0891)	  
Constant	   0.449	   0.456	   0.375	   0.466	   0.390	   0.432	   0.343	   0.440	   0.424	  
	  
(0.793)	   (0.795)	   (0.781)	   (0.805)	   (0.763)	   (0.799)	   (0.851)	   (0.798)	   (0.799)	  
Observations	   77	   77	   77	   77	   75	   77	   76	   76	   77	  
R-­‐squared	   0.574	   0.575	   0.577	   0.574	   0.604	   0.574	   0.567	   0.587	   0.576	  




Table	  7	  —	  Borrowing	  Behavior	  by	  Individual	  Time	  Preference	  (Strong	  Present	  Bias)	  
	  	   Non-­‐delinquent	  Borrower	  
Variables	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	   (7)	   (8)	   (9)	  
TP	  1	  	   -­‐0.0984	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
(0.105)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  TP	  2	  
	  
0.0905	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	  
(0.100)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  TP	  3	  
	   	  
0.101	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
(0.124)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  TP	  4	  
	   	   	  
0.208**	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
(0.0926)	  
	   	   	   	   	  TP	  5	  
	   	   	   	  
-­‐0.0782	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
(0.0934)	  
	   	   	   	  TP	  6	  
	   	   	   	   	  
-­‐0.0422	  
	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
(0.108)	  
	   	   	  TP	  7	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
-­‐0.00576	  
	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
(0.109)	  
	   	  TP	  8	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
0.0789	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
(0.0982)	  
	  TP	  9	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
-­‐0.113	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
(0.141)	  
Strong	  Present	  Bias	   0.0190	   0.0183	   0.0242	   0.0283	   0.0173	   0.0238	   0.0183	   0.00371	   0.0215	  
	  
(0.0857)	   (0.0869)	   (0.0878)	   (0.0875)	   (0.0885)	   (0.0853)	   (0.0962)	   (0.0855)	   (0.0871)	  
Risk	  Experiment	   0.0565**	   0.0495**	   0.0523**	   0.0428*	   0.0462*	   0.0502**	   0.0502**	   0.0491**	   0.0449*	  
	  
(0.0245)	   (0.0245)	   (0.0251)	   (0.0226)	   (0.0259)	   (0.0242)	   (0.0240)	   (0.0238)	   (0.0256)	  
Female	   -­‐0.0821	   -­‐0.0481	   -­‐0.0846	   -­‐0.0277	   -­‐0.0810	   -­‐0.0866	   -­‐0.0984	   -­‐0.0948	   -­‐0.0774	  
	  
(0.127)	   (0.139)	   (0.132)	   (0.133)	   (0.132)	   (0.137)	   (0.128)	   (0.127)	   (0.131)	  
Currently	  Married	   -­‐0.0357	   -­‐0.0309	   -­‐0.0237	   -­‐0.0692	   -­‐0.01000	   -­‐0.0145	   -­‐0.00842	   -­‐0.0312	   -­‐0.00479	  
	  
(0.136)	   (0.128)	   (0.143)	   (0.131)	   (0.127)	   (0.134)	   (0.134)	   (0.142)	   (0.134)	  
Age	   0.0422	   0.0422	   0.0489*	   0.0510**	   0.0390	   0.0410	   0.0426	   0.0404	   0.0463*	  
	  
(0.0263)	   (0.0259)	   (0.0269)	   (0.0245)	   (0.0264)	   (0.0262)	   (0.0260)	   (0.0263)	   (0.0276)	  
(Age)2	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000**	   -­‐0.000	   -­‐0.000	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000*	  
	  
(0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	  
Education	   -­‐0.0447	   -­‐0.0540	   -­‐0.0530	   -­‐0.0400	   -­‐0.0554	   -­‐0.0517	   -­‐0.0552	   -­‐0.0586	   -­‐0.0575*	  
	  
(0.0353)	   (0.0354)	   (0.0345)	   (0.0360)	   (0.0346)	   (0.0373)	   (0.0339)	   (0.0351)	   (0.0328)	  
Ln	  (Household	  Income)	   -­‐0.0261	   0.00268	   -­‐0.0154	   -­‐0.0444	   -­‐0.00899	   -­‐0.0306	   -­‐0.0206	   -­‐0.0347	   -­‐0.0120	  
	  
(0.103)	   (0.107)	   (0.101)	   (0.101)	   (0.108)	   (0.106)	   (0.106)	   (0.1000)	   (0.105)	  
Currently	  Employed	   0.125	   0.122	   0.134	   0.104	   0.120	   0.130	   0.136	   0.140	   0.131	  
	  
(0.0841)	   (0.0816)	   (0.0865)	   (0.0829)	   (0.0899)	   (0.0876)	   (0.0884)	   (0.0840)	   (0.0867)	  
Ln	  (Loan	  Size)	   -­‐0.0267	   -­‐0.00982	   -­‐0.0289	   -­‐0.00610	   -­‐0.0422	   -­‐0.0339	   -­‐0.0277	   -­‐0.0265	   -­‐0.0346	  
	  
(0.0843)	   (0.0843)	   (0.0873)	   (0.0836)	   (0.0857)	   (0.0826)	   (0.0833)	   (0.0872)	   (0.0833)	  
Rural	  Branch	   0.374***	   0.360***	   0.355***	   0.326***	   0.369***	   0.369***	   0.373***	   0.372***	   0.364***	  
	  
(0.0986)	   (0.0962)	   (0.101)	   (0.0979)	   (0.0978)	   (0.0971)	   (0.0991)	   (0.0931)	   (0.0969)	  
Researcher	   -­‐0.0691	   -­‐0.0653	   -­‐0.0664	   -­‐0.0720*	   -­‐0.0636	   -­‐0.0663	   -­‐0.0659	   -­‐0.0621	   -­‐0.0703	  
	  
(0.0429)	   (0.0455)	   (0.0442)	   (0.0420)	   (0.0454)	   (0.0450)	   (0.0449)	   (0.0449)	   (0.0480)	  
Enumerator	   -­‐0.00735	   -­‐0.0228	   -­‐0.00921	   -­‐0.0140	   -­‐0.0113	   -­‐0.00960	   -­‐0.0110	   -­‐0.0145	   -­‐0.0143	  
	  
(0.0291)	   (0.0308)	   (0.0281)	   (0.0291)	   (0.0273)	   (0.0277)	   (0.0283)	   (0.0281)	   (0.0280)	  
Ramadan	   -­‐0.619***	   -­‐0.614***	   -­‐0.618***	   -­‐0.603***	   -­‐0.616***	   -­‐0.621***	   -­‐0.617***	   -­‐0.603***	   -­‐0.622***	  
	  
(0.0930)	   (0.0941)	   (0.0911)	   (0.0892)	   (0.0926)	   (0.0918)	   (0.0917)	   (0.0989)	   (0.0928)	  
Constant	   0.484	   0.186	   0.210	   0.139	   0.570	   0.581	   0.445	   0.586	   0.476	  
	  
(0.813)	   (0.871)	   (0.847)	   (0.858)	   (0.826)	   (0.873)	   (0.827)	   (0.848)	   (0.804)	  
Observations	   77	   77	   77	   77	   77	   77	   77	   77	   77	  
R-­‐squared	   0.581	   0.580	   0.580	   0.609	   0.579	   0.575	   0.574	   0.578	   0.577	  




Table	  8	  —	  Borrowing	  Behavior	  by	  Individual	  Time	  Preference	  (Weak	  Present	  Bias)	  
	  	   Non-­‐delinquent	  Borrower	  
Variables	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	   (7)	   (8)	   (9)	  
TP	  1	   -­‐0.108	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
(0.103)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  TP	  2	  
	  
0.107	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	  
(0.0946)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  TP	  3	  
	   	  
0.0945	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
(0.126)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  TP	  4	  
	   	   	  
0.207**	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
(0.0905)	  
	   	   	   	   	  TP	  5	  
	   	   	   	  
-­‐0.0561	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
(0.0860)	  
	   	   	   	  TP	  6	  
	   	   	   	   	  
-­‐0.0118	  
	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
(0.104)	  
	   	   	  TP	  7	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
-­‐0.0314	  
	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
(0.100)	  
	   	  TP	  8	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
0.127	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
(0.0965)	  
	  TP	  9	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
-­‐0.132	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
(0.140)	  
Weak	  Present	  Bias	   0.149	   0.155	   0.139	   0.142	   0.130	   0.140	   0.147	   0.181*	   0.149	  
	  
(0.101)	   (0.103)	   (0.104)	   (0.0966)	   (0.0966)	   (0.0999)	   (0.106)	   (0.106)	   (0.105)	  
Risk	  Experiment	   0.0539**	   0.0461*	   0.0490**	   0.0395*	   0.0445*	   0.0471**	   0.0476**	   0.0453*	   0.0408	  
	  
(0.0237)	   (0.0235)	   (0.0243)	   (0.0218)	   (0.0247)	   (0.0233)	   (0.0231)	   (0.0228)	   (0.0250)	  
Female	   -­‐0.0516	   -­‐0.00859	   -­‐0.0588	   -­‐0.000655	   -­‐0.0611	   -­‐0.0688	   -­‐0.0658	   -­‐0.0574	   -­‐0.0449	  
	  
(0.136)	   (0.144)	   (0.138)	   (0.135)	   (0.140)	   (0.145)	   (0.138)	   (0.133)	   (0.142)	  
Currently	  Married	   -­‐0.0296	   -­‐0.0263	   -­‐0.0138	   -­‐0.0592	   -­‐0.00187	   -­‐0.00170	   -­‐0.000327	   -­‐0.0386	   0.00484	  
	  
(0.122)	   (0.111)	   (0.125)	   (0.115)	   (0.116)	   (0.121)	   (0.118)	   (0.127)	   (0.118)	  
Age	   0.0338	   0.0335	   0.0402	   0.0423	   0.0326	   0.0341	   0.0347	   0.0306	   0.0384	  
	  
(0.0276)	   (0.0266)	   (0.0276)	   (0.0254)	   (0.0268)	   (0.0270)	   (0.0269)	   (0.0272)	   (0.0281)	  
age2	   -­‐0.000	   -­‐0.000	   -­‐0.000	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000	   -­‐0.000	   -­‐0.000	   -­‐0.000	   -­‐0.000	  
	  
(0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	  
Education	   -­‐0.0478	   -­‐0.0580*	   -­‐0.0576*	   -­‐0.0449	   -­‐0.0591*	   -­‐0.0585	   -­‐0.0581*	   -­‐0.0630*	   -­‐0.0622*	  
	  
(0.0337)	   (0.0342)	   (0.0333)	   (0.0338)	   (0.0338)	   (0.0366)	   (0.0334)	   (0.0342)	   (0.0317)	  
Ln	  (Household	  Income)	   0.00547	   0.0404	   0.0146	   -­‐0.0126	   0.0152	   0.00559	   0.0179	   -­‐0.00707	   0.0220	  
	  
(0.104)	   (0.107)	   (0.102)	   (0.101)	   (0.108)	   (0.107)	   (0.105)	   (0.101)	   (0.106)	  
Currently	  Employed	   0.158*	   0.155*	   0.166*	   0.138	   0.154*	   0.166*	   0.172*	   0.179**	   0.165*	  
	  
(0.0870)	   (0.0837)	   (0.0894)	   (0.0844)	   (0.0913)	   (0.0898)	   (0.0891)	   (0.0873)	   (0.0889)	  
Ln	  (Loan	  Size)	   -­‐0.0188	   0.00124	   -­‐0.0202	   0.00338	   -­‐0.0309	   -­‐0.0212	   -­‐0.0225	   -­‐0.0228	   -­‐0.0274	  
	  
(0.0819)	   (0.0812)	   (0.0843)	   (0.0802)	   (0.0859)	   (0.0827)	   (0.0808)	   (0.0860)	   (0.0814)	  
Rural	  Branch	   0.407***	   0.391***	   0.387***	   0.357***	   0.398***	   0.402***	   0.406***	   0.408***	   0.395***	  
	  
(0.0975)	   (0.0956)	   (0.100)	   (0.0979)	   (0.0965)	   (0.0962)	   (0.0974)	   (0.0873)	   (0.0952)	  
Researcher	   -­‐0.0689	   -­‐0.0648	   -­‐0.0656	   -­‐0.0710*	   -­‐0.0637	   -­‐0.0653	   -­‐0.0662	   -­‐0.0605	   -­‐0.0704	  
	  
(0.0420)	   (0.0442)	   (0.0438)	   (0.0412)	   (0.0447)	   (0.0446)	   (0.0438)	   (0.0450)	   (0.0479)	  
Enumerator	   -­‐0.00865	   -­‐0.0267	   -­‐0.0111	   -­‐0.0159	   -­‐0.0128	   -­‐0.0124	   -­‐0.0116	   -­‐0.0173	   -­‐0.0166	  
	  
(0.0290)	   (0.0308)	   (0.0278)	   (0.0287)	   (0.0273)	   (0.0277)	   (0.0285)	   (0.0277)	   (0.0282)	  
Ramadan	   -­‐0.641***	   -­‐0.637***	   -­‐0.640***	   -­‐0.626***	   -­‐0.636***	   -­‐0.640***	   -­‐0.637***	   -­‐0.618***	   -­‐0.646***	  
	  
(0.0891)	   (0.0904)	   (0.0884)	   (0.0857)	   (0.0894)	   (0.0894)	   (0.0881)	   (0.0937)	   (0.0883)	  
Constant	   0.373	   0.0181	   0.121	   0.0338	   0.438	   0.382	   0.304	   0.528	   0.367	  
	  
(0.794)	   (0.847)	   (0.833)	   (0.829)	   (0.802)	   (0.864)	   (0.810)	   (0.831)	   (0.787)	  
Observations	   77	   77	   77	   77	   77	   77	   77	   77	   77	  
R-­‐squared	   0.595	   0.596	   0.592	   0.622	   0.590	   0.587	   0.588	   0.598	   0.592	  




Table	  9	  —	  Borrowing	  Behavior	  by	  Individual	  Time	  Preference	  (Future	  Bias	  Time	  Inconsistency)	  
	  	   Non-­‐delinquent	  Borrower	  
Variables	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	   (7)	   (8)	   (9)	  
TP	  1	   -­‐0.0882	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
(0.106)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  TP	  2	  
	  
0.0903	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  
	  
(0.101)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  TP	  3	  
	   	  
0.0897	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
(0.122)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  TP	  4	  
	   	   	  
0.208**	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
(0.0924)	  
	   	   	   	   	  TP	  5	  
	   	   	   	  
-­‐0.0932	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
(0.0925)	  
	   	   	   	  TP	  6	  
	   	   	   	   	  
-­‐0.0643	  
	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
(0.111)	  
	   	   	  TP	  7	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
-­‐0.0171	  
	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
(0.0974)	  
	   	  TP	  8	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
0.0681	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
(0.0968)	  
	  TP	  9	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
-­‐0.0821	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
(0.134)	  
Future	  Bias	  -­‐	   0.0905	   0.105	   0.0935	   0.109	   0.126	   0.126	   0.108	   0.0917	   0.0903	  
Time	  Inconsistency	   (0.122)	   (0.115)	   (0.119)	   (0.114)	   (0.119)	   (0.119)	   (0.120)	   (0.123)	   (0.120)	  
Risk	  Experiment	   0.0544**	   0.0479**	   0.0504**	   0.0410*	   0.0437*	   0.0483**	   0.0489**	   0.0481**	   0.0449*	  
	  
(0.0242)	   (0.0238)	   (0.0246)	   (0.0222)	   (0.0251)	   (0.0236)	   (0.0234)	   (0.0233)	   (0.0252)	  
Female	   -­‐0.105	   -­‐0.0731	   -­‐0.108	   -­‐0.0534	   -­‐0.107	   -­‐0.109	   -­‐0.122	   -­‐0.117	   -­‐0.105	  
	  
(0.136)	   (0.146)	   (0.140)	   (0.136)	   (0.138)	   (0.140)	   (0.136)	   (0.133)	   (0.137)	  
Currently	  Married	   -­‐0.0303	   -­‐0.0284	   -­‐0.0187	   -­‐0.0653	   -­‐0.00806	   -­‐0.0141	   -­‐0.00613	   -­‐0.0274	   -­‐0.00298	  
	  
(0.130)	   (0.121)	   (0.135)	   (0.123)	   (0.117)	   (0.125)	   (0.126)	   (0.139)	   (0.127)	  
Age	   0.0411	   0.0411	   0.0467*	   0.0492**	   0.0372	   0.0385	   0.0416	   0.0403	   0.0440	  
	  
(0.0266)	   (0.0262)	   (0.0268)	   (0.0244)	   (0.0263)	   (0.0264)	   (0.0266)	   (0.0262)	   (0.0276)	  
(Age)2	   -­‐0.000	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000**	   -­‐0.000	   -­‐0.000	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.000*	  
	  
(0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	  
Education	   -­‐0.0552	   -­‐0.0647*	   -­‐0.0634*	   -­‐0.0518	   -­‐0.0677*	   -­‐0.0628*	   -­‐0.0655*	   -­‐0.0665*	   -­‐0.0665*	  
	  
(0.0360)	   (0.0348)	   (0.0345)	   (0.0344)	   (0.0344)	   (0.0362)	   (0.0339)	   (0.0349)	   (0.0334)	  
Ln	  (Household	  Income)	   -­‐0.0192	   0.00971	   -­‐0.00901	   -­‐0.0358	   0.00144	   -­‐0.0260	   -­‐0.0103	   -­‐0.0281	   -­‐0.00810	  
	  
(0.102)	   (0.107)	   (0.100)	   (0.0997)	   (0.105)	   (0.105)	   (0.103)	   (0.0990)	   (0.104)	  
Currently	  Employed	   0.131	   0.128	   0.140*	   0.112	   0.123	   0.136	   0.143*	   0.142*	   0.138	  
	  
(0.0812)	   (0.0769)	   (0.0828)	   (0.0778)	   (0.0861)	   (0.0838)	   (0.0833)	   (0.0817)	   (0.0837)	  
Ln	  (Loan	  Size)	   -­‐0.0174	   0.000142	   -­‐0.0183	   0.00626	   -­‐0.0342	   -­‐0.0245	   -­‐0.0186	   -­‐0.0201	   -­‐0.0229	  
	  
(0.0842)	   (0.0851)	   (0.0866)	   (0.0821)	   (0.0877)	   (0.0824)	   (0.0830)	   (0.0872)	   (0.0839)	  
Rural	  Branch	   0.362***	   0.345***	   0.345***	   0.311***	   0.350***	   0.351***	   0.359***	   0.358***	   0.354***	  
	  
(0.0994)	   (0.0972)	   (0.100)	   (0.0983)	   (0.0988)	   (0.0974)	   (0.0976)	   (0.0931)	   (0.0973)	  
Researcher	   -­‐0.0646	   -­‐0.0607	   -­‐0.0619	   -­‐0.0668	   -­‐0.0579	   -­‐0.0609	   -­‐0.0616	   -­‐0.0590	   -­‐0.0648	  
	  
(0.0426)	   (0.0451)	   (0.0440)	   (0.0415)	   (0.0447)	   (0.0441)	   (0.0442)	   (0.0450)	   (0.0473)	  
Enumerator	   -­‐0.00944	   -­‐0.0246	   -­‐0.0113	   -­‐0.0162	   -­‐0.0133	   -­‐0.0111	   -­‐0.0124	   -­‐0.0152	   -­‐0.0152	  
	  
(0.0296)	   (0.0309)	   (0.0280)	   (0.0288)	   (0.0270)	   (0.0278)	   (0.0284)	   (0.0280)	   (0.0278)	  
Ramadan	   -­‐0.616***	   -­‐0.612***	   -­‐0.616***	   -­‐0.602***	   -­‐0.612***	   -­‐0.620***	   -­‐0.613***	   -­‐0.601***	   -­‐0.619***	  
	  
(0.0924)	   (0.0929)	   (0.0900)	   (0.0879)	   (0.0910)	   (0.0898)	   (0.0901)	   (0.0979)	   (0.0924)	  
Constant	   0.469	   0.174	   0.227	   0.126	   0.577	   0.633	   0.418	   0.556	   0.459	  
	  
(0.805)	   (0.869)	   (0.839)	   (0.838)	   (0.830)	   (0.872)	   (0.822)	   (0.833)	   (0.799)	  
Observations	   77	   77	   77	   77	   77	   77	   77	   77	   77	  
R-­‐squared	   0.584	   0.585	   0.583	   0.614	   0.586	   0.581	   0.579	   0.582	   0.580	  
Notes:	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	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APPENDIX A  
Risk Experiment 
You will see that on this page there are circles. [Show the six circles on the paper] Each 
circle represents two chances. I am going to explain each circle, and then you will get to make 
your decision. For this activity, pick the circle that you like the best. 
 
Each circle is divided in half and they have money in them. Each circle has two possible 
outcomes, the low amount and the high amount. Most of these circles represent the amount of 
money you can win. However in this top circle it is possible to lose money [point to the loss]. 
You have an equal chance at winning the low and the high amounts. 
 
This is how the game will work. At the end of today’s session, if this activity is the one picked 
for payment [pick a random circle to show them], then I will flip a coin. There are two sides 
to the coin. One side is “Heads” and the other is “Tails.” [Show the two sides of the coin] If 
you flip “Heads”, you will earn the high amount from the circle you picked. If you flip “Tails” 
you will earn the low amount from the circle you picked [show participant the coin]. 
 
Let’s look at example. [Only do one to make sure they understand] 
 
• Look first at the (1 JD, 1 JD) circle. Go ahead and pretend this is the one you 
want and put a check here [pretend to mark the circle]. If you flip “Tails” you 
will earn 1 JD. If you flip “Heads” you will also earn 1 JD. So, if you choose this 
circle you will earn 4 JD for sure, no matter what you draw. 
• Let’s see what you would make if you choose the (0 JD, 3 JD) circle. Put a check 
here [pretend to mark the circle]. If you flip “Tails” you will earn 0 JD. If you 
flip “Heads” you will earn 3 JD.  
 
[EXPERIMENTER] 
Now I will give your sheet so you can carefully choose which circle you feel is the best choice. 
Please circle the choice when you are ready. 
 
[EXPERIMENTER] 





































3 JD 0 JD 
3.5 JD - 0.25 JD 
1 JD 1 JD 
1.5 JD 0.75 JD 
2 JD 0.5 JD 
2.5 JD 0.25 JD 
21% of borrowers chose choice 1 
15% of borrowers chose choice 2 
7% of borrowers chose choice 3 
9% of borrowers chose choice 4 
31% of borrowers chose choice 5 
16% of borrowers chose choice 6 
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APPENDIX B  
Time Preference Experiment (Protocol) 
I would like to offer you a choice between two types of discount vouchers. The amount of money that 
your store voucher is worth will depend on the date at which you are able to redeem the voucher. Each 
type of voucher will not be valid until a specified date. Which of the following would you prefer? 
 
A) A single voucher to [STORE NAME] that is worth 1JD that you may redeem for any good 
purchased at the store beginning 1 week from now. 
B) A single voucher to [STORE NAME] that is worth 1.50 JD that you may redeem for any good 
purchased at the store beginning 5 weeks from now. 
 
A) A single voucher to [STORE NAME] that is worth 1JD that you may redeem for any good 
purchased at the store beginning 1 year from now. 
B) A single voucher to [STORE NAME] that is worth 1.50 JD that you may redeem for any good 
purchased at the store beginning 1 year and 1 month from now. 
 
*[EXPERIMENTER]* 
This information is for our records only and confidentiality of your responses is assured. Now, before we 









NAME: _______________________________                          Mobile:_________________________________ 
 
STORE NAME: _______________________________________ 
This voucher is redeemable starting _______________________ 
 




A summary index can be constructed in the following manner (Anderson, 2008): 
1. Adjust all outcomes by aligning all signs so the positive outcome is always in reference 
of a better outcome. 
2. Convert outcomes to effect sizes by demeaning all outcomes, and then divide each 
outcome by the group standard deviation12. This step normalizes the outcomes to allow 
for comparability. The transformed outcomes will be referred to as !. 
3. Define H groupings of outcomes such that every outcome !!"is assigned to one of these 
H groupings. This provides !! outcomes in each group z and k indexes outcomes with a 
group. 
4. Create a new variable, !!", which is a weighted average of !!"# for individual i in group 
p. Weight outcomes !!"# by the inverse of the covariance matrix of the converted 
outcomes in group p when constructing the new variable !!". !!" = (1!  Σ!!!)!!  (1!  Σ!!!!!") , where 1 is a column vector of ones, Σ!!! is the inverted 
















                                                
12 The group standard deviation is typically the control group. However, for the purpose of this research I divide 





Risk	  Questions	   Coded	  response	  as	  0	   Coded	  response	  as	  1	  
Risk	  1	   Which	  of	  the	  following	  applies	  to	  you	  more…	   You	  can	  never	  be	  too	  
careful	  with	  money	  	  
You	  need	  to	  take	  
risks	  to	  make	  money	  
Risk	  2	   Do	  you	  admire	  people	  who…	   Takes	  precautions	   Take	  risks	  
Risk	  3	   To	  have	  a	  successful	  business,	  it	  is	  more	  important	  to…	   Continue	  with	  what	  has	  been	  proven	  to	  work	  
	  
Try	  new	  but	  unproven	  ideas	  
Risk	  4	   If	  you	  take	  a	  risk	  and	  you	  are	  successful,	  would	  you	  be	  more	  likely	  to…	   Take	  caution	  next	  time	   Take	  the	  same	  risk	  next	  time	  
	  
Risk	  5	   Do	  you	  often…	   Stick	  with	  what	  you	  know	  
	  
Try	  new	  things	  
Risk	  6	   If	  your	  friend	  owned	  a	  successful	  sewing	  business,	  would	  you	  think	  that	  it	  is	  a	  good	  idea	  to	  start	  your	  own	  sewing	  business	  based	  off	  of	  your	  friend's	  success?	   Yes	   No	  
Risk	  7	   Is	  it	  more	  important	  to	  be…	   Cautious	   Bold	  
Risk	  8	   When	  your	  friend	  is	  making	  important	  decisions	  for	  his	  or	  her	  business,	  is	  it	  better	  for	  him	  or	  her	  to…	   Take	  precautions	   Take	  risks	  
Risk	  9	   If	  you	  are	  in	  a	  moving	  car,	  do	  you	  feel	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  
wear	  your	  seatbelt?	  
















Time	  Preference	  Questions	   Coded	  response	  as	  0	   Coded	  response	  as	  1	  
TP	  1	   If	  you	  have	  an	  unpleasant	  task,	  would	  you	  be	  more	  likely	  
to…	  
Put	  it	  off	  until	  
tomorrow	  
Do	  it	  today	  
TP	  2	   If	  someone	  were	  to	  give	  you	  a	  gift,	  would	  you	  be	  more	  
likely	  to	  prefer…	  
A	  modest	  gift	  today	   An	  extravagant	  gift	  
in	  the	  future	  
TP	  3	   If	  you	  have	  to	  pay	  a	  bill	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  month	  and	  you	  
have	  money	  now	  to	  pay	  for	  it,	  would	  you	  be	  more	  likely	  
to…	  
Pay	  it	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
month	  	  
	  
Pay	  it	  today	  
TP	  4	   If	  you	  have	  2	  Kanafa,	  would	  you	  be	  more	  likely	  to…	   Eat	  them	  all	  today	  	  	  	  	   Eat	  one	  today	  and	  
save	  the	  rest	  for	  
later	  	  
TP	  5	   If	  you	  receive	  50	  dinars	  today,	  would	  you	  be	  more	  likely	  
to…	  
Spend	  it	  today	   Save	  it	  for	  a	  special	  
occasion	  
TP	  6	   If	  you	  had	  an	  important	  chore	  to	  do	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
week,	  would	  you	  
Do	  it	  later	  because	  you	  
want	  to	  enjoy	  today	  
and	  you	  know	  you	  will	  
get	  it	  done	  before	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  week	  
Do	  it	  today	  because	  
you	  know	  it	  is	  not	  
likely	  that	  you	  will	  
complete	  it	  later	  
TP	  7	   Would	  you	  say	  that	  it	  is	  better	  to…	   Work	  and	  earn	  600	  JD	  
per	  month	  
Earn	  400	  JD	  while	  
taking	  classes	  that	  
will	  help	  you	  earn	  
1000	  JD	  per	  month	  
in	  two	  years	  
TP	  8	   Do	  you…	   Eat	  some	  foods	  that	  
are	  delicious	  even	  
though	  they	  may	  be	  
unhealthy	  
Always	  try	  to	  eat	  
food	  that	  is	  good	  for	  
you	  











Table	  F	  —	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  of	  Survey	  Questions	  
	   	   Total	   Non-­‐delinquent	   Delinquent	   T-­‐Statistic	  
	  
	   Frequency	  
(Percent)	   	  
If	  you	  have	  an	  unpleasant	  task,	  
would	  you	  be	  more	  likely	  to…	  








	   0.6729	  








Which	  of	  the	  following	  applies	  to	  
you	  more…	  
You	  can	  never	  be	  too	  









You	  need	  to	  take	  







If	  someone	  were	  to	  give	  you	  a	  gift,	  
would	  you	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  
prefer…	  









An	  extravagant	  gift	  






















If	  you	  have	  to	  pay	  a	  bill	  at	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  month	  and	  you	  have	  money	  
now	  to	  pay	  for	  it,	  would	  you	  be	  
more	  likely	  to…	  















To	  have	  a	  successful	  business,	  it	  is	  
more	  important	  to…	  
Continue	  with	  what	  


















If	  you	  have	  2	  Kanafa,	  would	  you	  be	  
more	  likely	  to…	  









Eat	  one	  today	  and	  








If	  you	  take	  a	  risk	  and	  you	  are	  
successful,	  would	  you	  be	  more	  
likely	  to…	  




















If	  you	  receive	  50	  dinars	  today,	  
would	  you	  be	  more	  likely	  to…	  















Do	  you	  often…	  















If	  you	  had	  an	  important	  chore	  to	  
do	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  week,	  would	  
you	  
Do	  it	  today	  because	  
you	  know	  it	  is	  not	  
likely	  that	  you	  will	  








-­‐0.0447	  Do	  it	  later	  because	  
you	  want	  to	  enjoy	  
today	  and	  you	  know	  
you	  will	  get	  it	  done	  








If	  your	  friend	  owned	  a	  successful	  
sewing	  business,	  would	  you	  think	  
that	  it	  is	  a	  good	  idea	  to	  start	  your	  
own	  sewing	  business	  based	  off	  of	  















Would	  you	  say	  that	  it	  is	  better	  to…	  
	  
Earn	  400	  JD	  while	  
taking	  classes	  that	  
will	  help	  you	  earn	  
1000	  JD	  per	  month	  









Work	  and	  earn	  600	  
















(46%)	   1.2562*	  




(54%)	   	  
Do	  you…	  
Eat	  some	  foods	  that	  
are	  delicious	  even	  










Always	  try	  to	  eat	  








When	  your	  friend	  is	  making	  
important	  decisions	  for	  his	  or	  her	  

















Overall,	  how	  patient	  would	  you	  















If	  you	  are	  in	  a	  moving	  car,	  do	  you	  
feel…	  
It	  is	  necessary	  to	  









It	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  







Generally	  speaking,	  would	  you	  say	  
that	  most	  people	  you	  meet	  for	  the	  
first	  time	  can	  be	  trusted	  or	  that	  
you	  need	  to	  be	  very	  careful	  in	  
dealing	  with	  people	  that	  you	  meet	  
for	  the	  first	  time?	  















Do	  you	  think	  most	  people	  would	  
try	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  you	  if	  they	  
got	  a	  chance,	  or	  would	  they	  try	  to	  
be	  fair?	  
Would	  take	  















Would	  you	  say	  that	  most	  of	  the	  
time	  people	  try	  to	  be	  helpful,	  or	  
that	  they	  are	  mostly	  just	  looking	  
out	  for	  themselves?	  

















Sample	   	   97	   61	   36	   95	  
***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	   	   	  
 
